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On october 17, 2006, president george W. bUsh signed into law the U.S. Military Commissions Act (MCA), responding to the Supreme Court’s holding in Hamdan 
v. Rumsfeld.1 In Hamdan, the Court found that the military com-
missions that the U.S. government used to try detainees from the 
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)2 violated both the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice and the Geneva Conventions. Shortly 
after the Court issued the Hamdan decision, the government 
enacted the MCA to establish “procedures governing the use of 
military commissions to try alien unlawful enemy combatants 
engaged in hostilities against the United States for violating the 
law of war and other offenses triable by military commission.”3
Undoubtedly, critics raise a number of constitutional chal-
lenges to the MCA, including its treatment of habeas corpus and 
other basic due process rights. This article examines whether 
the MCA’s “material support” provisions,4 which allow the 
government to try persons suspected of having provided mate-
rial support to terrorists in military commissions, violate First 
Amendment freedom of speech and association rights. First, 
it evaluates evolving definitions of “material support” in the 
U.S. Code over the last decade. As the MCA does not provide 
a definition for the term, the government relies on the recently 
expanded and contested statutory definition from 18 U.S.C. 
2339 B. Next, the article reviews the case law and considers 
whether the MCA’s “material support” provisions criminal-
ize “mere advocacy” or any other forms of speech which may 
not lead to the “incitement of imminent lawless action.” It also 
examines whether the case law indicates that the MCA’s “mate-
rial support” provisions are overly vague and have an unconsti-
tutional “chilling effect” on First Amendment rights. Finally, 
this article analyzes whether the MCA applies to U.S. citizens 
and whether the First Amendment protects resident aliens. The 
article concludes that using the current definition from the U.S. 
Code, the MCA’s “material support” provisions do violate the 
First Amendment. In order to find whether an actionable cause 
of action exists, however, the courts must determine whether the 
MCA applies to U.S. citizens and whether the First Amendment 
protects resident aliens’ rights to association and speech. 
The evolviNg defiNiTioN of maTeRial suPPoRT
The MCA allows the government to bring “unlawful com-
batants” from the GWOT before military commissions for trial. 
Section 948a(1)(A) of the MCA defines an “unlawful combat-
ant” as:
(i) a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has 
purposefully and materially supported hostilities against 
the United States or its co-belligerents who is not a lawful 
enemy combatant (including a person who is part of the 
Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces); or
(ii) a person who, before, on, or after the date of the 
enactment of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, has 
been determined to be an unlawful enemy combatant by a 
Combatant Status Review Tribunal or another competent 
tribunal established under the authority of the President or 
the Secretary of Defense.5
In determining First Amendment issues in the MCA, this 
article focuses on the “material support” provisions in 948a(1)
(A)(i). The MCA includes in its definition of “unlawful combat-
ants” not only those who have actively engaged in hostilities 
against the United States, but also those who have “materially 
supported” hostilities. While the MCA provides no further guid-
ance in determining what constitutes “material support,” its 
inclusion relies on prior statutory definitions. 
18 U.S.C. 2339B prohibits material support to terrorist 
organizations and outlines its elements.6 Congress first banned 
material support to persons or organizations that the Secretary of 
State deemed “terrorists” under the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Aiming to eliminate 
funding and assistance to terrorist organizations, some with 
charitable or humanitarian branches within the United States, 
Congress enacted broad prohibitions on material support for such 
organizations. Congress defined “material support or resources” 
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in AEDPA as “currency or other financial securities, financial 
services, lodging, training, safe houses, false documentation or 
identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, 
lethal substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and 
other physical assets, except medical or religious materials.”7 
The AEDPA definition made no distinction between support 
for lawful and unlawful practices and included the ambiguous 
terms “training” and “personnel,” which lead to uncertainty on 
the types of actions falling under these definitions.
In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on 
New York and Washington, D.C., the USA PATRIOT Act 
expanded the definition of material support. Section 805 of the 
PATRIOT Act amended 18 U.S.C. 2339 to include the terms 
“expert advice or assistance” after “training.”8 Similar to court 
findings that “training” and “personnel” from prior definitions 
were overly vague and unconstitutional, courts also found that 
the terms “expert advice” and “assistance” were unconstitution-
ally vague.9 The PATRIOT ACT is like AEDPA insofar as both 
statutes are vague and fail to distinguish between support for 
lawful and unlawful objectives. 
Congress responded to these definitional ambiguity problems 
by enacting the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act of 2004 (IRTPA). To bolster the material support provisions 
in 18 U.S.C. 2339, Congress added the following definitions to 
the terms “personnel,” “training,” and “expert advice or assis-
tance:”
[P]ersonnel (1) or more individuals who may be or include 
oneself) . . .;
(2) the term ‘training’ means instruction or teaching 
designed to impart a specific skill, as opposed to general 
knowledge; and
(3) the term ‘expert advice or assistance’ means advice or 
assistance derived from scientific, technical or other special-
ized knowledge.10
IRTPA amendments establish that a person must have 
knowledge that a group is a designated terrorist organization that 
has engaged in or currently engages in terrorism for a person to 
have materially supported a terrorist group.11 Like AEDPA and 
the PATRIOT Act, IRTPA did not include a distinction between 
support for lawful and unlawful objectives. The material sup-
port provisions in 18 U.S.C. 2339B, as amended by IRTPA, 
are current and in force. The newly amended provisions have 
been challenged in the courts and the MCA will provide another 
opportunity for their review.
WheTheR “exPeRT advice,” “assisTaNce,” oR 
“TRaiNiNg” coNsTiTuTe PRoTecTed sPeech
To determine whether material support provisions in the 
MCA violate First Amendment free speech protections, courts 
must first determine whether “advice,” “assistance,” or “train-
ing” are protected speech.12 The following three tests may 
establish whether the forms of speech prohibited in the material 
support definitions constitute protected speech.
The cleaR aNd PReseNT daNgeR TesT
Congress expressly and controversially invoked the language 
of war when drafting and passing the MCA. The MCA expressly 
governs only military trials for “unlawful combatants” charged 
with war crimes.13 The significance of invoking this languages 
lies within the Court’s findings that the Constitution allows 
greater latitude to prohibit speech that creates a “clear and pres-
ent danger.”14 The Court in Schenck v. United States held that, 
“The question in every case is whether the words used are used 
in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a 
clear and present danger that they will bring about the substan-
tive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.”15 The Court fur-
ther found that during a time of war the government can restrict 
speech that might hinder the war effort, even if that speech 
would be protected in peace time.16 The Court’s understanding 
of the current situation is reflected in its decisions in Rasul v. 
Bush, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, in which it 
consistently affirmed government classifications of counterter-
rorist strategies as operating within a “war” on terrorism.17 The 
Court may likely determine that the MCA operates within a time 
of war and that certain forms of speech could create a “clear and 
present danger” to national security. 
“The PATRIOT ACT  
is like the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death 
Penalty Act: both statutes 
are vague and fail to  
distinguish between  
support for lawful and 
unlawful objectives.”
Even if some speech created a clear and present danger, the 
question remains whether free speech in the form of “advice,” 
“assistance,” or “training” in the MCA’s definition of material 
support amounts to a “substantive evil” that the government may 
legitimately suppress. In Schenck, the Court found that distribut-
ing anti-war materials aimed at obstructing the draft constituted 
a hindrance to the national war effort, or substantive evil, and 
held that speech that hinders the war effort may be restricted by 
the government.18 Additionally, in Gillars v. United States the 
Court found that a U.S. citizen aided and comforted the enemy 
by recording a Nazi radio drama while the United States was 
at war with Nazi Germany.19 The Court held that because the 
defendant’s words were spoken knowingly and purposefully as 
“part of a program of propaganda warfare,” the First Amendment 
did not protect her treasonous speech, and Congress had a right 
to prohibit the evil.20 Assuming courts continue to accept gov-
ernment arguments that the United States is engaged in a global 
“war” on terrorism, MCA material support provisions may pass 
the clear and present danger test. As distribution of anti-war 
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pamphlets “hindered” war efforts, and participation in enemy 
propaganda campaigns “aided and comforted” the enemy, the 
Court may find that certain forms of aid, assistance, or training 
benefit the “enemy”21 (terrorist organizations) during a time of 
“war” (GWOT) and constitute a substantive evil, which the First 
Amendment does not protect.
The BRaNdeNBuRg TesT
If courts continue to find that certain speech within the 
GWOT may pose a “clear and present danger” and that terror-
ists are “enemies,” the government must still prove that aiding, 
assisting, or training “terrorist organizations” is “directed to 
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to 
incite or produce such action.”22 The Court expanded the clear 
and present danger test through a series of decisions23 that culmi-
nated with Brandenburg v. Ohio. The Court considered an Ohio 
law that punished members of the Ku Klux Klan for advocating 
lawless action.24 Finding that the First Amendment forbids such 
undistinguished government intrusion on free speech, the Court 
held that “[s]tatutes affecting the right of . . . freedom of speech 
must observe the established distinctions between mere advo-
cacy and incitement to imminent lawless action.”25 The courts 
will likely apply the same test to the MCA. 
Whether the MCA criminalizes protected speech depends 
upon whether courts interpret “aid,” “assistance,” or “training” 
as the kind of speech that may incite imminent lawless action. 
The government may argue that any aid, assistance, or training 
to enemy terrorists inherently leads to lawless action, even if the 
imminence is protracted. In Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., 
for example, the Court found that a publisher could not claim 
protection under the First Amendment for publishing a how-to 
guide for hired murderers.26 The Court held that speech amount-
ing to aiding and abetting a crime, even if the imminence is 
extended, is not protected speech.27 With the MCA, the govern-
ment might assert that any assistance to organizations the gov-
ernment designates as terrorists constitutes aiding and abetting a 
crime and is not protected under the First Amendment. 
This reasoning fails to distinguish between advocacy of 
unlawful action and incitement to unlawful action.28 It is clear 
that the First Amendment does not protect aiding, assisting, or 
training a terrorist organization in ways likely to result in immi-
nent lawless action. Activities outside the First Amendment’s 
protection may include education on bomb making or instruc-
tion on killing specific people or targets. It is less clear whether 
the First Amendment would fail to protect transparent and mani-
festly benign aid, assistance, or training in the form of humani-
tarian projects or peace negotiation skills, or forms which do not 
incite imminent lawless action to “terrorist” organizations with 
humanitarian aid branches. 
The vagueNess TesT
The meaning and application of the MCA’s material support 
provision must be clear to a person of common intelligence.29 
Courts have found vague and ambiguous statutes unconstitu-
tional for three reasons: 
(1) to protect accused persons from being punished for 
behavior they could not have known was illegal; (2) to 
avoid subjective enforcement of laws based on govern-
ment officers’ ‘arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement’; 
and (3) to avoid any chilling effect on the exercise of First 
Amendment freedoms.30
Courts have used this test to determine whether definitions 
for “aid,” “assistance,” or “training” are overly vague when 
applied to material support for terrorism, and whether the vague-
ness results in a “chilling effect” on the First Amendment.
The Court considered these questions in Humanitarian Law 
Project v. Gonzales (HLP II). Challenging AEDPA and later 
the PATRIOT Act, Plaintiffs in HLP II sought to support law-
ful activities of two organizations the government designated 
as terrorists.31 Specifically, Plaintiffs sought to support the 
organizations through “training in the use of humanitarian and 
international law,” training in political and advocacy skills at 
the national and international levels, aid following devastat-
ing tsunamis, and “training in . . . present[ing] . . . claims to 
mediators and international bodies for tsunami-related aid.”32 
Plaintiffs argued that these forms of aid, assistance, and training 
would be prohibited under 18 U.S.C. 2339B, using definitions 
of material support found in AEDPA and the PATRIOT Act.33 
The Court agreed with Plaintiffs that the terms “expert advice,” 
“assistance,” or “training” are impermissibly and unconstitu-
tionally vague.34 The Court also agreed with Plaintiffs that the 
2004 IRTPA amendment35 to 18 U.S.C. 2339B is “inadequate 
to cure potential vagueness issues because it does not clarify 
the prohibited conduct with sufficient definiteness for ordinary 
people.”36
Definitions of material support in 18 U.S.C. 2339B under 
the vagueness test and under all three tests are weak, and fail 
to draw a distinction between support for lawful activities and 
support for activities directly related to terrorism. Relying on 
18 U.S.C. 2339B to define material support, the MCA prohibits 
all forms of aid, assistance, and training — not just forms that 
incite imminent unlawful activity, or forms that directly assist 
“To determine whether material support provisions in the 
Military Commissions Act violate First Amendment free 
speech protections, courts must first determine whether 
‘advice,’ ‘assistance,’ or ‘training’ are protected speech.”
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the commission of crimes.37 The law treats support for overtly 
unlawful actions and entirely legal activities alike, leading at 
times to absurd results, such as prosecution of a college stu-
dent running a website with links to websites featuring Muslim 
sheikhs advocating violent jihad.38 This failure to distinguish 
between lawful and unlawful activities is done notwithstand-
ing evidence that both chambers of Congress anticipated more 
narrow and specific readings of material support prohibitions 
while drafting the legislation.39 Consequently, it seems that just 
as the Court in HLP II held that the material support provisions 
in AEDPA and the PATRIOT Act were impermissibly vague, 
the courts may find the MCA material support provisions to be 
equally vague and chilling of First Amendment freedoms.
ideNTifyiNg The scoPe of The mca’s aPPlicaTioN
If courts find that the MCA violates First Amendment rights 
because it does not incite imminent lawless action or because 
it is impermissibly vague, courts must still determine to whom 
the statute applies, and whether the First Amendment protects 
accused violators of the statute. 
does The mca aPPly To u.s. ciTizeNs?
It is uncertain whether the MCA excludes U.S. citizens 
from the jurisdiction of military commissions. The definition of 
“unlawful enemy combatant” in section 948a fails to distinguish 
between citizens and non-citizens.40 Section 948b provides that 
MCA procedures apply to “alien unlawful enemy combatants.”41 
Congressional and executive leaders assert that military com-
mission may try persons defined as “unlawful enemy combat-
ants” under section 948a regardless of their citizenship status.42 
Moreover, in Hamdi, the Court found that the government could 
hold U.S. citizens as “enemy combatants” in the GWOT;43 and 
the MCA’s “unlawful enemy combatant” definition may apply 
to U.S. citizens.44 Courts must determine whether including 
“alien” to the term “unlawful enemy combatants” in one sec-
tion of the MCA adequately protects U.S. citizens accused of 
materially supporting or belonging to terrorist organizations 
from falling within the scope of the MCA. Under such a broad 
interpretation of the MCA, U.S. citizens that the Executive has 
determined either materially supported or belonged to a terrorist 
organization may be subject to arrest, indefinite detention, and 
trial by military commissions that provide fewer legal rights 
and procedural safeguards than those available within civilian 
courts.45 
do ResideNT alieNs have fiRsT ameNdmeNT RighTs?
The issue of resident aliens’ constitutional rights complicates 
the scope of the MCA’s application. While the MCA expressly 
applies to all aliens, including resident aliens living legally 
within the United States, it is unclear whether First Amendment 
rights extend to non-citizens living within the country’s ter-
ritory.46 Legal experts disagree on whether the Constitution 
applies to non-citizens, but courts have found that resident non-
citizens have constitutional rights, including First Amendment 
rights. 47 While the Constitution reserves some rights exclu-
sively for citizens, such as the right to vote, the Bill of Rights 
does not distinguish between citizens and non-citizens when 
referring to basic civil liberties, including First Amendment 
free speech rights.48 Instead, the Bill of Rights restricts specific 
governmental actions. While the scope of constitutional rights 
available to resident aliens is ambiguous, most experts agree that 
the Constitution provides non-citizens with First Amendment 
rights, such as speech and association. Similar to the scenario 
where the MCA applies to U.S. citizens, if courts find that First 
Amendment rights do not protect resident aliens, the MCA 
would ostensibly authorize the Executive to arrest, indefinitely 
detain, and try by military commission any non-citizen living 
within the United States suspected of having provided aid, 
assistance, or training to an organization the Executive deemed 
as “terrorist.” 
RecommeNdaTioNs foR uPholdiNg  
coNsTiTuTioNal liBeRTies
coUrts Will soon consider whether the MCA violates 
constitutional provisions, including the First Amendment. The 
MCA defines “unlawful enemy combatants” as those who have 
materially supported terrorist organizations, and it relies on 
18 U.S.C 2339B to define material support. The courts should 
find that the MCA’s material support provisions are vague and 
violate the First Amendment. Similarly, the MCA’s material 
support provisions do not distinguish between aid, assistance, 
and training for lawful and unlawful activities. Courts should 
therefore find that lawful forms of aid, assistance, and training 
do not incite imminent lawless action. Courts must determine 
whether the MCA’s definition of “unlawful enemy combatant” 
applies to U.S. citizens, since the statute is not clear. Finally, 
courts must reaffirm whether the First Amendment protects resi-
dent aliens’ rights to association and speech within the context 
of the GWOT. 
To avoid such First Amendment challenges to the MCA, the 
U.S. government should make clear distinctions between law-
ful activities not related to terrorist acts and unlawful terrorist 
activities within the statutory definitions of material support. 
Narrowing the definition of material support would still allow 
the government to prosecute dangerous and unlawful sup-
port to terrorists while respecting citizens’ and residents’ First 
Amendment rights.    HRB
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